: But as a materialist, wouldn't you hold that any
: conventions in the mind's operations must stem from
: conventions in the brain's operations?
Sure, but being a materialist doesn't mean supporting the identity: mind = brain. Whatever's going on in the mind is somehow grounded in brain activity (and maybe more than just the brain, but some physical activity let's say). It's the particular idea of the brain operating by convention that bothers me.
: Perhaps I should have said "idiosyncrasies" or
: something like that...my point was that the brain as
: an operating system may have certain favored types of
: calculations which lend themselves to processing
: problems via the assumption of an external
: world...even if an abstract, idealized computer could
: do more efficiently without them.
I'm with you right up to 'the assumption of an external world...'. Again, the metaphor that makes more sense to me is mind as operating system, brain as hardware, with perhaps some (or perhaps no) hardwiring. I don't see how brain processes shine light on the existence of an external world. It just doesn't sound like the sort of thing that could shine light on that.
: Well, perhaps unobservables can pay for themselves : in some cases.
I think this is right on target, and accurately pricing our assumptions is a worthwhile task, I'd say.
